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In the long stretch oftime covered by business cycles, the economies
ofthe industrialized world have undergone many profound changes of
structure, institutions, and modes of operation. Business cycles have
continued to have much in common as the nlost durable and pervasive
form of short-term motion of these economies, but they have also
changed significantly. This study seeks to identify and analyze some
of these changes. We concentrate on the longer and relatively well-
established developments in the United States.
Sections 9.1 and 9.2 review some historical facts and hypotheses
concerned with types of change in cyclical behavior. Next we take a
long-run view ofthe durations ofcyclical phases, note the shifts in the
relative length of expansions and contractions (9.3), and relate them
to changing trends in prices (9.4). Section 9.5 examines the amplitudes
of cyclical movements in production and employment during the past
hundred years. There follows an analysis of structural shifts in em-
ployment and their cyclical effects (9.6); trends and cyclical changes
in unemployment and labor force participation (9.7); and the conse-
quences for the business cycles ofthe altered composition ofpersonal
income, reJlecting the expansion of government, transfer payments,
and so on (9.8). A discussion of the relationship between growth and
variability ofeconomic change (9.9) completes this part ofour report.
The remaining sections deal with changes in particular categories of
cyclical indicators. Ofspecial interest here is the behavior ofwholesale
or producer prices (9.10) and interest rates (9.11). Also, we examine
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the consistency of timing of the leading, coincident, and lagging indi-
cators overas long a period as the dataallow (9.12). Finally, we present
our conclusions and suggestions for further research.
9.1 Business Cycles and Growth: Background and Some Hypotheses
Business cycles, defined as recurrent sequences of persistent and
pervasive expansions and contractions in economic activities, are at
least as old as the modern industrialization and growth processes in
the principal capitalist countries. The earliest evidence of their pres-
ence, from British and United States business annals and statistics,
reaches back into the eighteenth century.
The impressively high long-term growth rates of the era are well
documented by the series ofdecade averages that reveal upward trends
in employment, output, capital, productivity, and per capita consump-
tion (see, e.g., Kuznets 1971; U.S. Department of Commerce 1973).
However, over shorter periods, growth ofthe major private enterprise
economies was very uneven. Each decade witnessed at least one con-
traction ofaggregate economic activity in each country, but more typ-
ically there were two and sometimes three. This refers to all countries
covered by the business annals (Thorp 1926) and the NBER business
cycle chronologies (Burns and Mitchell 1946).1 Most ofthese setbacks
were mild, but some were serious. A contraction was always followed
by an expansion, which as a rule consisted ofrecovery to the highest
levels previously attained and a phase of net growth ending in a new
record high ("peak") of activity. Only on a few occasions did a peak
fail to exceed the preceding peak. Similarly, successive troughs usually
reached higher levels, except when a particularly weak recovery or
deep depression occurred. Thus overall growth was achieved through
expansionary spurts punctuated every few years by mild but general-
ized slowdowns orrecessions and at longer irregular intervals by major
depressions.
During this epoch the economies, societies, and political systems
involved changed profoundly in many respects. There is substantial
agreement among those who have studied the subject intensively that
business cycles are "a product of culture ... found only in modern
nations where economic activities are organized mainly through busi-
ness enterprises and where individuals enjoy considerable freedom in
1. The annals begin in 1790 for England and the United States, in 1840 for France, in
1853 for Germany, in 1867 for Austria, and in 1870 for twelve other countries on four
continents. They end in 1925 (Thorp 1926) and in 1931 (Thorp 1932). The NBER chro-
nologies start in 1792, 1834, 1840, and 1866 for Great Britain, the United States, France,
and Germany, respectively. See appendix A to this volume for more detail.521 Major Changes in Cyclical Behavior
producing, pricing, trading, and savingorinvesting" (Burns 1968,228).2
Itis therefore plausible to look for important changes in business cycles
as a result of the changes in the structure of production, markets,
institutions, and policies.
It is also possible to argue that the influence runs partly in the op-
posite direction and to see in the development of business cycles a
major instrument for changes in the econorny and society. Marx pre-
dicted a trend toward intensification of crises as capital/labor ratios
increase, workers are displaced and pauperized, and profit rates fall,
but his predictions were belied by the spread of prosperity and the
capacity ofcapitalism and democracy first to survive and then to avoid
severe depressions and bouts ofhigh unemployment. Keynes worried
about whether investment would absorb savings at full employment in
countries growing in wealth, where capital accumulation lowers the
return to investors. Hansen moved further., expecting weaker booms
and deeper slumps to result from reduced opportunities for investment
and increased propensity to save in "mature economies" with slower
population growth. History dealt as harshly with these new "secular
stagnation" hypotheses as it had with the earlier ones.3 Yet they are
revived in various forms whenever sluggish business conditions prevail
for some time, as in the recent period of so-called stagflation.
Conversely, in times of substantial stability and growth, such as the
mid-1920s and 1960s in the United States, the idea tends to gain ground
thatbusiness cycles arebecoming" obsolete'" orare being''ironedout"
by better public and business policies. In 1921-29 the Federal Reserve
System "took-and perhaps even more was given--credit for the gen-
erally stable conditions that prevailed, and high hopes were placed in
the potency of monetary policy as then administered" (Friedman and
Schwartz 1963,240). In the mid-1960s, many economists believed that
2. In contrast, seasonal (daily and annual) cycles, although influenced by custom-
for example, the timing ofholidays-are in large measure part and parcel ofthe natural
environment of man. Centrally directed or collectivist economies suffer from various
types of instability induced partly by nature (e.g., variations in harvest) and partly by
government and societal actions (e.g., political purges; planning errors; imposition of,
resistance to, and relaxationofpriceand othercontrols). Inreactionto suchdisturbances,
the overall growth rates ofthese systems can vary widelyovertime, but such fluctuations
are very different from business cycles, just as closed centralized economies are fun-
damentally unlike open market or "mixed" economies.
3. Consider also the classical theories of stationary state and the law of historically
diminishing returns, as well as the Malthusian population principle, in the light of the
great increase in the average standard of living in the densely populated countries of
Western Europe and Japan. A hundred years after Malthus, Veblen anticipated a con-
vergenceofmoderneconomiestoa chronic stateofmild depression. Keynes sympathized
with the intuitive underconsumption hypotheses of Malthus and Hobson as forerunners
ofhis theoryofdeficienteffective demand. Forappraisals ofcurrentinterest, see Mitchell
1927, chap. 9; Keynes 1936, chap. 23; Haberler 1964 (1937), chap. 5; and Burns and
Mitchell 1946, 382-83.522 Victor Zarnowitz/GeofTrey H. Moore
the new use ofdiscretionary fiscal policy was on its way to "dethroning
the cyclical model" (Heller 1966; see also Gordon 1969, 26-29).
9.2 Three Types of Change
Itis useful to distinguish three types ofchange in the cyclicalbehavior
of the market-oriented economies: long-term or secular trends; dis-
continuous or episodic changes; and cyclical changes. The hypotheses
noted in section 9.1 envisage a gradual intensification or a gradual
moderation ofbusiness cycles and hence concern the first type. These
are presumably irreversible changes or trends that can be projected.
The second type are temporary changes observed in particularperiods.
They mayor may not continue and mayor may not be reversed.
The third type are "cycles of cycles." Here the NBER-designated
business cycles are viewed as subdivisions of longer major cycles or
as mixtures of several distinct types. Four patterns, named for the
economists who have investigated them in detail, are found in the
literature:
1. The Kondratieff (about forty-eight to sixty years). These "long
waves" have been associated with large movements in the level of
prices and perhaps also with major technological innovations, but they
do not show up in the volumes of production and consumption. Too
few of such swings have been observed to prove or disprove their
existence conclusively.
2. The Kuznets (fifteen to twenty-five years). These cycles have been
associated with construction ofbuildings and transport facilities (high-
ways, rail lines, etc.), growth of population and labor force, urban
development, and business formation. Here there is more supportive
evidence of a historical nature.
3. The Jug/ar (about seven to ten years). These are the "major"
business cycles, such as the Great Depression of the 1930s, that have
received a great deal of attention in academic literature.
4. The Kitchin (about three to four years). These "minor" or "forty-
month" business cycles are often related to fluctuations in inventory
investment.
Schumpeter (1939, vol. 1, chap. 5) developed the much discussed
scheme of three Kitchins per Juglar and six Juglars per Kondratieff.
Burns and Mitchell (1946, chap. 11) reported largely negative or in-
conclusive results from tests of the former hypothesis for the United
States. More generally, they found thatlong-run cyclical changes rarely
had a dominant influence on the short-run cyclical behaviorofa sample
ofUnited States series on general business activity, prices, production,
investment in capital goods, and yields and the volume of trade in
security markets.523 Major Changes in Cyclical Behavior
Business cycles have certainly varied greatly in amplitude, diffusion,
and duration, and important distinctions can be made between major
and minor cycles-for example, with respect to the relative roles and
behavior of monetary aggregates, fixed investment, and inventory in-
vestment. But these matters will not occupy us here. There is little
evidence ofperiodicities in the occurrenceofgroups ofmajorand minor
cycles. However, we shall consider, in the light of currently available
data, one old hypothesis related to the Kondratieffcycles, namely that
business cycle expansions have tended to be longer (and larger?) and
contractions shorter (and smaller?) during the upward phases of the
long waves in prices than during the downward phases.
This paper, then, will focus in particular on the "secular" changes
in cyclical behavior, a category that naturally seems to deserve most
attention. However, the secular and the discontinuous changes are not
necessarily clearly differentiated. Notall trends canbe safely projected,
and not all changes labeled secular may prove irreversible.
9.3 Durations of Cyclical Phases before and after World War II
Studies ofbusiness cycles in the pre-World War II era have not been
able to documentmajorchanges ofeithersecularordiscontinuous type.
Tests by Burns and Mitchell (1946, chap. 10) gave little or no support
to the view that substantial long-term changes occurred in the durations
and amplitudes of cyclical movements in the sample of long United
States time series. Mills's (1926) hypothesis that the cycles tend to get
shorter in stages of rapid growth also failed to be confirmed by these
tests. Comparisons ofcycles before and after 1914 (then often alleged
to have marked a "break" in American business history) indicated
more basic similarities than differences, although the fluctuations dur-
ing the period between the two world wars were unusually large.
Such major changes of systematic nature as can be observed in
aggregate measures and particular aspects of cyclical behavior refer
principally to comparisons between the period after World War II and
the earlier era. As shown in table 9.1, the eight contractions of 1945-
82 were on the average much shorter, and the eight expansions much
longer, than the corresponding phases in each ofthe three subsets with
equal numbers of consecutive business cycles that together span the
preceding century (lines 1-4, cols. 3 and 5). In 1846-1945, the mean
duration ofexpansions was thirty months, that ofcontractions twenty
months; in 1945-82, expansions averaged forty-five months and con-
tractions eleven months.
The proportion of time that the economy spent declining dropped
from 45% in 1846-1945 to 20% in 1945-82 (col. 9). These results are




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.525 Major Changes in Cyclical Behavior
omitted that include the long wartime expansions and the relatively
short postwar contractions (col. 10). The mean durations of the pre-
1945 and post-1945 peacetime expansions are twenty-six and thirty-
four months; contractions, twenty-one and eleven months.
A few of the mildest contractions in the NBER chronology of the
nineteenth-century cycles may actually have been episodes of below-
trend but still positive growth rates-pronounced retardations rather
than absolute declines (Zarnowitz 1981). That is, the chronology may
have (inadvertently) recognized some growth cycle slowdowns rather
than recessions, which would tend to make expansions and contrac-
tions more nearly equal in length (see appendix A, sect. 8, to this
volume). But allowing for this possibility would not significantly alter
ourconclusions. The proportions oftime in contractions for peacetime
cycles, recalculated on this assumption, would be 40% before 1945 and
(an unchanged) 25% after 1945.
Contractions became more uniform in length after World War II (col.
6). Expansions become less uniform, but this is chiefly the effect of
the wars, all but one of which occurred in the last two of our four
periods (col. 4).
With regard to the total cycle durations, neither the means nor the
standard deviations indicate any significant trends. Expansions length-
enedand contractions shortened drastically, butcycle lengths remained
about the same (cols. 7 and 8).
One of the implications of these findings is that contractions have
become more predictable in length than they were in earlier times. For
example, if we take two standard deviations as the likely range, this
was eight months in the period 1945-82. Added to the mean ofeleven
months, this makes nineteen months the practical upper limit. In fact,
no contractionin this periodlastedmore than seventeenmonths. Before
1945, the estimated ranges was twenty-six months, yielding an upper
limit offorty-six months, which was not exceeded in the Great Depres-
sion (forty-three months).
9.4 Business Cycle Phases and Long-Term Trends in Prices
Between 1789 and 1932, wholesale and consumerprices in the United
States followed alternating upward and downward trends (table 9.2).
The long upswings lasted between 21 and 25 years; the long downswings
varied more, from 12 to 32 years. These movements largely canceled
each other over the entire stretch of more than 140 years, so that the
level of prices at the bottom of the Great Depression was not much
higher than when George Washington took office. The half-century
since 1932, however, witnessed the longest, largest, and most contin-
uous inflation on record. Exceptin the recessions of1937-38and 1948-526 Victor Zarnowitz/GeotTrey H. Moore
49, no significant price-leveldeclines occurredin this period. Wholesale
prices increased by a factor ofalmost nine, consumerprices by a factor
of seven (cf. cols. 4-7 of the table).
Apartfrom the seculartrends, the comprehensive price indexes show
generally procyclical short-term movements. Before 1932, they rose
during most business expansions and fell during most business con-
tractions, conforming in this sense about three-quarters of the time.4
In periods of upward trend, the cyclical rises in prices were on the
average large and the declines small; in periods of downward trend,
the opposite situation prevailed, that is, the rises tended to be small
and the declines large (cols. 8 and 9). But after 1949 prices kept in-
creasing even when the economy declined, although virtually every
major slowdown and recession was associated with a temporary re-
duction in the inflation rate.
To be sure, the long-period averages in table 9.2 conceal a very large
amountofvariation overtime, bothbetweenthe wartime andpeacetime
episodes and among the latter. Nonetheless, it is important to note that
over the past fifty years as a whole inflation became a grave problem
notbecause it was unusually high duringexpansionsbutbecause, unlike
earlier times, it was only slowed, not reversed, during contractions.
The booms have not grown more inflationary, but the deflationary slumps
have disappeared. Indeed, the average percentage increase per year in
wholesale prices is 1.8 for the ten recessions of 1937-82, substantially
higher than the 1.2 figure for the entire 193-year period covered in table
9.2.
In his introductory chapter to Thorp's Business Annals (1926, 65-
66), Mitchell observed that the ratios of"prosperous" to "depressed"
years have been systematically higher in periods of rising trends in
wholesale prices than in periods of declining trends. For the United
States and England, the former ratios averaged 2.7 and 2.3, the latter
0.8 and 0.6, respectively. Twenty years later, armed with better and
longer chronologies, Burns and Mitchell confirmed the hypothesis that
long swings in prices were associated with the relative length ofbusi-
ness cycle expansions and contractions (1946, 437-38, 538). The results
based on their data for Great Britain, France, and Germany are pre-
sentedin table 9.3, sections B, C, andD. SectionA shows more detailed
findings for the United States, based on longer and up'dated records
(see Moore 1983a, chap. 15).
4. The monthly index of wholesale prices (Warren/Pearson, 1854-91, and Bureau of
Labor Statistics, 1891-1933) rose in thirteen out of twenty expansions and fell in sev-
enteen out of twenty contractions. Snyder's monthly index of the general price level,
covering a broad assortment of prices (1861-1933), rose in fifteen out of eighteen ex-
pansions and fell in thirteen out ofnineteen contractions. See Burns and Mitchell 1946,


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.530 Victor Zamowitz/GeotTrey H. Moore
In each period of rising trend in prices, expansions lasted on the
average much longer than contractions, in most instances more than
twice as long. In each period of falling trend in prices, expansions
tended to be either about as long as contractions (this is so for the
United States) or considerably shorter (for the other countries). These
contrasts are both regular and large (table 9.3, cols. 2, 5, and 7).
In addition, the relative frequency ofexpansions has been greater in
thelong upswings ofprices, thatofcontractionsinthe long downswings
(cf. cols. 1and 4). Hence the total phase durations and their ratios add
further emphasis to the showing ofthe corresponding statistics for the
average phase durations (cols. 3, 6, and 8).
Prices have risen strongly in wartime expansions, butthe relationship
documented above does not rely mainly on this fact. When the five
major wars of United States history are excluded (as in lines 2-5 of
the table), the contrast between the periods ofupward and downward
price trends is not much diminished.
How should the association between the price trends and the relative
durationofbusinesscyclephasesbeinterpreted?Withpricesintheshort
runbeinglessthanfully flexible, fluctuations inaggregatedemand, what-
ever their causes, will be met in part by output movements, in part by
price adjustments. As a result, cyclicalchanges in outputand prices will
tendtobepositivelycorrelated. Beyondthat, actualandexpectedprice-
level rises may temporarily stimulate economic activity ifthey are per-
ceived as favorable movements in relative prices and profits, and anal-
ogously price-level declines may be discouraging if taken as signals of
adversechanges in the same variables. Butthesecanonly bevery short-
lived effects insofar as they depend on misperceptions of general for
relative price movements owing to information lags. Propagation mech-
anisms that may amplify and prolong the consequences of such errors
have beensuggested, however, and views onthe matterare still divided,
as reflected in the recent debates on the equilibrium models ofbusiness
cycles (Zarnowitz 1984). But few have argued that long-run trends in
the level ofprices have clear and lasting effects on real activity or that
secular inflation is necessary for economic growth. There is essential
agreementthatthelongpricemovementsreflect mainly trends in money
and credit creation that have no definite, permanent effects on the evo-
lution of the economy in real terms.
Indeed, there appears to be no association between the rate of in-
flation during each business cycle and the relative length ofexpansion
versus contraction. The expansion/contraction ratios for the two cycles
between 1953 and 1960 (3.9 and 3.0) were not unlike the ratio for the
1973-80 cycle (3.6), but inflation averaged a little over 1% per year in
1953-60and9% peryearin 1973-80. GNPin constantdollars advanced
at similar average annual rates in the two periods (2.6% and 2.8%), and531 Major Changes in Cyclical Behavior
unemployment increased from 4.9% in 1953-60 to 6.6% in 1973-80.
As is well known, growth in the supply ofmoney and credit accelerated
sharply in the intervening twenty years; this resulted in more inflation
and higher interest rates without stimulating the economy and reducing
unemployment.
Prices tend to move up briskly when expansions gather steam, par-
ticularly in the boom phases at high levels of capital and labor utili-
zation; they often used to decline and now typically rise more slowly
in business contractions, particularly long slumps. This reflects both
the cyclical fluctuations in aggregate demand and the typical reactions
ofbusinessmen. In a recession costs are cut, profit margins are pared,
and discounts are given to move heavy inventories or prevent their
costly accumulation. Failures increase, and going out ofbusiness sales
at low prices multiply as well. Wages rise more slowly and are reduced
here and there under the pressure ofincreased layoffs and unemploy-
ment. Costly overtime work is cut back or eliminated. Consumers
become more economical and cautious, especially about borrowingand
spending on durable goods. All ofthis works in the direction oflower
prices or at least lower inflation rates. Thus it is not surprising that the
trends are toward less inflation (or more deflation) in periods during
which business contractions are relatively long and frequent and that
the converse applies to periods dominated by expansions (see also
Moore 1983a, chaps. 14 and 15).
Thusitis notthelonginflations thatshouldbecreditedwith shortening
recessions and lengthening expansions; rather, the opposite chain of
influence deservestobeconsidered, in combinationwiththe multiplicity
of factors that would historically account for the shifts in the relative
duration ofbusiness cycle phases. These include money and credit trends
and financial innovations; changes in the structure of production, em-
ployment, and markets; changes in economic policies, institutions, and
regulations; and major external shocks such as wars, financial crises,
large failures, explosions and collapses ofbasic commodity prices, and
gold discoveries. To apportion these influences to the observed shifts
in the natureofbusinesscycleswould surelybeanimportantbutmassive
research undertaking that cannot be attempted here.
9.5 The Reduced Severity of Recessions since World War II
The limitations of the available time series data make it difficult to
measure the amplitude of business cycles, particularly over long his-
torical periods for which there are few monthly or quarterly statistics
as comprehensive as such current indicators as real GNP, personal
income, manufacturing and trade sales, and employment. To compare
the size ofrecent expansions and contractions with those of the more532 Victor Zamowitz/GeofTrey H. Moore
distant past, about the best we can do is to use indexes of business
activity or production and nonagricultural employment (table 9.4).
These comparisons are inevitably crude because of compositional
shifts in the available measures ofbusiness activity and employment.5
In particular, factory or manufacturing employment (used before 1929)
is typically more variable over the business cycle than total nonagri-
cultural employment, which includes a large and rising share of the
relatively stable services (see next section). But such differences in the
data probably account only in part for the large contrasts observed
between the average percentage amplitudes in table 9.4. These mea-
sures are much smaller for 1945-82 than for 1912-45 or 1914-45. The
cyclical movements in business activity and employment were also on
the average smallerin 1885-1912or 1891-1914thanin the periodduring
and between the two world wars, but by much narrower margins.
The ranking ofthe three subperiods is the same for expansions and
contractions, but the relative differences between the average ampli-
tudes are greater for contractions. The exclusion ofthe wartime cycles
does not alter the qualitative findings just summarized (its main con-
sequence is to reduce the average expansion amplitudes for the periods
concerned). When the amplitudes of expansions and contractions are
added without regard to sign, the results once more confirm the shifts
toward smaller movements ofproduction and employment after 1945,
for both all cycles and peacetime cycles (cols. 1,3, and 5).
The cyclical movements in the series covered were in general less
variable in 1945-82 than in the earlier periods, as indicated by the
standard deviations of the individual amplitude measures (cols. 2, 4,
and 6). This applies strongly and without exception to the comparisons
with 1912-45 or 1914-45.
What these measures suggest, then, is that business contractions
have been on the average milder in the post-World War II era and also
that their depth varied less across the recent cycles than it did in
5. The Axe/Houghton index (used for the 1885-91 cycles) is based on pig iron pro-
duction, imports, bank clearings outside New York City, and traffic revenue per mile
for selected railroads. The Babson index (for 1891-1920) is a base-year weighted ag-
gregate of seasonally adjusted physical volume or constant-dollar series, with coverage
expanding from eleven to thirty-three components. It includes manufactures, minerals,
agricultural marketings, construction, railway freight ton-miles, electric power and foreign-
trade volume, weighted by value added. The Federal Reserve Board index ofindustrial
production (1920-82) initially included about fifty series. Its coverage increased over
time to more than two hundred series representing output in manufacturing, mining, and
public utilities. The index of factory employment for 1891-1911 is based on data for
Massachusetts, NewJersey, and NewYork(Jerome 1926). The BureauofLaborStatistics
(BLS) index of factory employment (1913-82) is based on a national sample of coop-
erating national establishments. The BLS series on nonagricultural employment (used
after 1933) is based on monthly reports from a very large number of establishments
(some 160,(00). (Formoredetail, see Moore 1961a, vol. 2; U.S. DepartmentofCommerce
1977.)533 Major Changes in Cyclical Behavior
earlier times. These findings parallel those on the shorter and more
uniform durations ofthe recent contractions as reported in section 9.3
above.
The moderation of business cycles, manifest in the relatively brief,
mild, and infrequent recessions ofthe 1950s and 1960s, was clearly an
international phenomenon. Extraordinarily long and vigorous expan-
sions occurred in Japan, West Germany, France, and Italy. One pre-
sumed reason lies in unique initial conditions. The end ofthe warfound
Europe and the Far East economically in stages ofunprecedented ex-
haustion. Yet the war left behind not only the ruins of much of the
physical capital of industry and commerce but also huge backlogs of
unutilized but skilled human resources and unsatisfied demand. What
followed was an eraofGreatReconstruction: first a restorationofsound
currencies and free markets, then rapid growth ofemployment, output,
investment, and trade. Cyclical setbacks assumed for some time the
form ofretardations ofgrowth rather than absolute declines. The United
States economy, starting after the war from so much higher levels,
intactand very strong, grew more slowly thanthatofJapanand Western
Europe (otherthan the United Kingdom).6 H:ere mild contractions con-
tinued to recur, although the expansion in the 1960s persisted beyond
all previous experience and expectations.
This record suggests the hypothesis that higher rates ofreal growth,
which prevailed in many countries in the first quarter-century after
1945 underconditions favoring capitalformation and international trade
and development, tend to be associated with less cyclical instability.
We shall examine the United States evidence on this point in section
9.9 below.
Another type ofpartial explanation relies on structural changes that
make the contemporary highly developed economies less recession-
prone. Trends in the industrial composition of employment illustrate
such changes (sect. 9.6). Shifts in the stnlcture of personal income
provide another example (sect. 9.8). Here postdepression reforms con-
cerning taxes and transfer payments that act as "built-in stabilizers"
have played an important role.7
6. For example, the average annual growth rates of real GNP in 1950-69 were 3.9%
for the United States, 6.8% for West Germany, and 5.3% for France. Japan's output
grew 9.7% per year in 1952-69, Italy's 5.6% per year in 1951-69. The corresponding
average for the United Kingdom, 1950-69, was 2.7%. S(~e U.S. DepartmentofCommerce
1973,99.
7. Similarly, deposit insurance is believed to have strengthened public confidence in
the financial system and prevented the runs on banks that were a major feature of the
crises and some depressions in the pre-World War II era. On the other hand, there are
some new sources of instability in this area, such as recurrent disintermediation, credit
controls, and ··credit crunches"; financial innovations and fluctuations in the demand








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.536 Victor Zamowitz/Geoffrey H. Moore
There are still other general hypotheses that are by no means in-
compatible with those noted above. Probably the one most discussed
is that discretionary demand management has become more sophisti-
cated and effective in reducing cyclical instability. This is obviously a
critical issue but also one very difficult to test. Most observers would
likely agree that some successes were scored by United States mon-
etary and fiscal policies in the 1950s and 1960s but that the record was
mixed and marked by increasing errors on the inflationary side. The
topic will not be pursued here.
9.6 Structural Shifts in Employment and Their Cyclical Effects
The share ofUnited States employment accounted for by agriculture
dropped from 48% in 1869 to 21% in 1929 and 4% in 1970. Business
cycles have contributed to major swings in food prices, but they have
weak effects on the number of persons engaged in, and total output
of, farming. Business cycles are to a large extent a product of indus-
trialization. Despite the great importance ofthe strongdownward trend
in agricultural employment, we shall concentrate on shifts in the in-
dustrial composition ofnonagricultural employment, for two reasons.
(1) In recent times, the changing nature of business cycles has been
strongly influenced by these shifts, and much less so by the develop-
ments in agriculture, partly because the percentage employed in farm-
ing, though still declining, has already reached very low levels. (2) Over
the longer run, the huge shift away from agriculture would overshadow
the trends we wish to examine.
Table 9.5 shows that in total nonagricultural employment, the com-
bined share accounted for by manufacturing, mining, and construction
and by transportation, communications, and public utilities was stable
in 1869-99 at about 56% but declined steadily to 48% by 1929. In the
five cycles between the peaks of 1929 and 1957, that share fluctuated
in the narrow range of43% to 46%, but in the next five cycles, 1957-
81, it fell steadily from 42% to 33%. The gainers included trade,
insurance, real estate, personal and business services, and govern-
ment-all service industries in the broad sense. This sector as a whole
employed 44% ofall persons engaged in nonagricultural production in
1869, 51% in 1929, and 67% in 1979-81 (cf. cols. 9 and 10 in table
9.5).
In the present context, the importance of this strong trend in the
composition of employment rests on the fact that the rising industries
have been much less recession-prone than the declining industries. The
net result was a substantial reduction in the sensitivity of total em-























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.538 Victor Zamowitz/GeotTrey H. Moore
Table 9.6 provides the evidence. The average drop in employment
during the recessions of 1948-82 varied from 10% per year for durable
manufactures to 4-5% for the other sensitive industries: nondurable
manufactures, mining, construction, and transportation, and so on. In
trade, the declines averaged less than 1%, and in services, finance, and
government, employment actually increased by about 2%, so these
industries have been most resistant to cyclical declines (col. 3).
When the first four post-World War II contractions (1948-60) are
separated from the last four (1970-82), some shifts in detail are
observed, but the same division holds between the relatively reces-
sion-prone and recession-proof industries (cols. 1 and 2). Indeed,
employment in most of the latter decreased much less or increased
much more during the recessions of 1970-82 than during those of
1948-60.
Ifthe 1959 distribution ofemployment among the nine major indus-
tries had prevailed in the four recessions of 1948-60, the average re-
duction in nonagricultural employment (otherthings equal) would have
been 2.5%. For 1970-82 the corresponding estimate is 2%; for all eight
contractions 1948-82 it is 2.3%. With the 1969 distribution, the reduc-
tions would have been 2.3%, 1.8%, and 2.0% for 1948-60, 1970-82,
and 1948-82, respectively. With the 1982 distributions, the estimates
are 1.7%, 1.0%, and 1.3%.
Between 1929 and 1959 shifts of this type were probably much less
important, as table 9.5 suggests. Now we see that they had significant
effects between 1959 and 1969 and much stronger effects between
1969 and 1982. Will they endure as a source of employment stabili-
zation in the future? Ten years ago the United States Bureau ofLabor
Statistics (BLS) made projections to 1985 that assumed that the share
of government and private service industries would continue to in-
crease. Their most recent projections to 1995, however, imply a ces-
sation (but not a reversal) of the overall shift toward the more reces-
sion-proof industries (table 9.6, col. 7). The rise in personal and
business services is expected to be offset by a relative decline in
government employment.
The expansion ofthe share ofgovernment in the economy persisted
so long that even many who deplore this development regard it as
nearly inevitable ("'Wagner's law"). Yet it is not a natural, irreversible
tendency, and forces opposed to it may be getting stronger.
The demand for services in general is often hypothesized to be
more income elastic than the demand for goods, but Fuchs (1968,
3-5) noted that the proportion of services in total output was the
same in 1965 as in 1929. He suggested that the shift of employment
from industry to service is explained largely by the higher labor
requirements in the latter sector. Output per worker grew much more539 Major Changes in Cyclical Behavior
slowly in the production of services than in the production ofgoods.8
But real output of services, and therefore productivity, is difficult
to measure and often poorly estimated. The notion of a continuing
shift into less productive industries and occupations seems worri-
some and hard to reconcile with competitive markets. In the current
controversy on new industrial policies, proponents urge a govern-
ment-supported "reindustrialization" drive that, they claim, would
make the United States economy more productive and more com-
petitive internationally. If this reverses the trend described above,
however, the consequences for cyclical stability may offset some of
the benefits.
9.7 Trends and Cyclical Changes in Unemployment and Labor Force
Participation
Although the risk of losing a job has been reduced by the shift in
the industrial composition ofemployment, the unemployment rate has
fluctuated around a rising trend since the late 1960s. In this period shifts
ofproductdemandandderived labordemandbetweenspecific markets,
industries, and occupations were accelerated by several developments,
notably the intensification, fading, and end of the Vietnam War; the
oil price increases; the swift spread of new products and technologies
(computerization); and the decline ofsome old industries such as steel,
prompted in part by increasing competition from imports. The unusu-
ally large intersectoral shifts contributed to the increases in unem-
ployment (Lilien 1982). In addition, other noncyclical factors probably
operated in the same direction. The composition of the labor force
shifted toward greater participation by women and teenagers, groups
with relatively high rates oflabor market turnover and unemployment.
Higher unemployment benefits and wider coverage have probably added
to the average time spentinjob searchand hence to the average duration
and rate of unemployment. At the same time, the percentage of the
working-age population employed has risen, reaching a peacetime re-
cord high in 1979.
In the recession of 1981-82, the highest attained rate of unemploy-
ment was 10.8%, exceeded only by the maximum rate reached during
the major depressions of 1920-21 (not much higher) and 1929-33 and
1937-38 (which were extraordinarily high). On the other hand, the
increase in the unemployment rate in 1981-82 was not particularly
8. Thus the average annual rates ofchange in output per worker were 2.2% in industry
and 1.1% in service (3.4% in agriculture). The classification here is much the same as
in table 9.6, butindustry includes government enterprise (service always includes general
government). The corresponding statistics for 1959-82 are industry 1.9% and service














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.542 Victor Zamowitz/Geoffrey H. Moore
large. Jobless rates in recent contractions were generally much higher
than in previous contractions of comparable size, 1923-24 and 1926-
27. This can be seen clearly in table 9.7, which compares the duration,
depth, and diffusion ofUnited States business cycle contractions since
1920, using measures ofproduction, employment, and unemployment.
The measures are highly but far from perfectly correlated (see the
matrix of the correlation coefficients in table 9.7). Of course, unem-
ployment changes and levels are inversely associated with the declines
in real GNP, industrial production, and nonfarm employment. The mea-
sures ofdepth oramplitude (cols. 2-6) are most closely related to each
other, but the correlations involving duration and diffusion (cols. 1and
7) are also significant.
Comparisons oftheseandotherstatistics suggestthatfour mild reces-
sions occurred during the sixty-two years covered in the table, one in
the 1920s (1926-27), and three since 1960 (1960-61, 1969-70, and
1980). There were six sharp recessions, all but one (1923-24) in the
post-World War II period (1948-49, 1953-54, 1957-58, 1973-75, and
1981-82). The three major depressions go back to 1920-21 and the
1930s: the "GreatDepression" of1929-33 was in many respects unique
and was by far the most severe according to all measures. The 1945
recession was also quite particular because ofits timing (end ofWorld
War II) and nature (transition back to peacetime production). It was
briefand mild in terms ofunemployment, sharp in terms ofthe decline
in industrial production.
The ranks in table 9.7, column 8, based on the averages ofthe ranks
ofthe entries in each ofthe columns 1-7, agree with the classification
above. The only ambiguity refers to the sui generis 1945 reconversion
episode.
An important caveat should be entered at this point, namely, that
there is no way to construct a really satisfactory single measure ofthe
severity of recessions. Cyclical movements are complex and differ-
entiated in terms ofduration, diffusion, and depth. Some are relatively
shortbutlarge and pervasive, such as the business contractionof1937-
38; others are ofsimilar length but small and less widely spread, such
as the recessions of 1960-61 and 1970. The use of average ranks is a
crude approximation procedure, which is further aggravated by the
gaps in the data. Nevertheless, the results appear to be sensible in that
they agree with much broader evidence from historical and statistical
studies. We have experimented with other data without finding any
good reasons to alter our conclusions.9
9. In particular, attempts to close the gaps in ranks run into problems ofcomparability.
The declines in factory employment (BLS) rank the contractions of 1920-21, 1923-24,
and 1926-27 in agreement with the labels MD, SR, and MR, respectively (they are
-31.1%, -13.7%, and -5.3%). But factory employment has larger amplitudes than543 Major Changes in Cyclical Behavior
Coming back to the unemployment rate, it is the change in, rather
than the level of, this variable that deserves most attention as an in-
dicator of relative cyclical performance. The level attained during a
recession is influenced in part by the level reached during the preceding
expansion-that is, it combines a measure ofthe weakness ofthe pre-
ceding expansion with the severity of the recession. Moreover, the
level is influenced by trends in the age/sex composition of the labor
force, as illustrated by the results from a -Bureau of Labor Statistics
study (table 9.8).10
The rise in unemployment rate between 1959 and 1977 would have
been much smaller if the age/sex composition of the labor force had
remained as it was in 1957 or in 1967. Over the short periods encom-
passed by recession, however, these demographic changes are much
less consequential, hence the change in the rate during a recession is
affected less by these shifts and more by factors related to the severity
of the recession itself.
In addition, it is important to consider the sensitivity of the labor
force itselfto changing market conditions and the implications this has
for the interpretation of the unemployment measures. In a recession,
some additional workers enterthe laborforc·e to bolsterdecliningfamily
incomes. At the same time some unemployed workers, frustrated in
their job search, withdraw from the labor market. Indeed, when the
prospects for finding work at good wages appear to be poor, they may
not even compensate for the expected search costs, so some would-
be new entrants orreentrants will not even commence looking forjobs.
Here as elsewhere, then, income and substitution effects can coexist
in practice as well as in theory, and the empirical question is which
one prevails. The evidence is that the civilian labor force, apart from
its dominant upward trend, tends to respond positively to business
cycles. That is, the "discouraged workers" effect generally outweighs
the "added workers" effect.
The elasticity ofthe response of the labor force to cyclical changes
in the demand for workers is in the aggregate not high, perhaps about
0.2 on the average (Mincer 1966, 88). Much more sensitive are those
groups that are typified by relatively weak (but growing) attachment
to the laborforce, namely women and youth (especially working wives
and students). On the other hand, the participation rate of adult men
declined fairly steadily from 89% in 1948 to 78% in 1983. Among older
total nonagricultural employment. For example, the declines in 1929-33 were - 43.0%
and - 31.6% respectively; in 1937-38, - 21.2% and - 10.8%. Real GNP also declined
strongly between the years 1944 and 1946 (by some 16%), butchanges in the composition
of output in this period of transition from wartime to peacetime production make it
difficult to interpret this development.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.546 Victor Zarnowitz/Geoffrey H. Moore
Table 9.8 The Shifting Demographic Structure of Unemployment, 1959-77
Unemployment Rate as Estimated from
Constant Age/Sex Distribution of Labor Force
Unemployment
Year Rate 1957 Weights 1967 Weights
(1) (2) (3)
1959 5.5 5.4 5.8
1969 3.5 3.1 3.4
1973 4.8 4.1 4.5
1977 7.0 6.0 6.7
men, age forty-five to sixty-four, earlier retirement became financially
more attractive and increasingly frequent in the 1960s, and the down-
ward movement in labor force participation accelerated in the 1970s
(e.g., it was 92% in 1960,90% in 1968, and 86% in 1984; see Bednarzik
and Klein 1977, 8).
It has been suggested that, when combined, all these shifts in com-
position "imply an over-all trend toward an increasingly sensitive,
variable, and flexible labor force" (Mincer 1967, 17). As the laborforce
responsiveness ofa group rises, the cyclical amplitude and conformity
of its measured unemployment rate decline. Entries and reentries be-
come more frequent during expansions, when search costs are low and
jobconditions favorable. Entry rates decline and withdrawals rise when
business is sluggish, reducing the labor force. Hence the change in
unemployment may understate the true loss of potential employment
and output. According to some indirect estimates, based on regressions
of the labor force on cyclical indicators such as the employment/pop-
ulation ratios, the "hidden unemployment" was large indeed under
relatively adverse labor market conditions (several million people in
the early 1960s). But the estimates indicate a heavy concentration of
this phenomenon in the categories of ~~secondary"workers who spend
a relatively high proportion of time outside the labor force. Many of
these people make their decisions to enter or withdraw in reaction to
changes in labordemand as well as in supply and otherrelevantfactors.
Still, to some extent the labor force variation also reflects the tendency
for discouraged workers to disappear in business expansions and reap-
pear in contractions (Mincer 1966, 100-105; 1967, 16-20).11
The percentage of the working-age population employed is affected
very differently by these factors than is the unemployment rate. In
11. Overlongerperiods, laborforce growth mayrespond directlytofavorable economic
conditions. Using the data in the form of changes in percentage points per decade,
Easterlin demonstrates that the contribution to labor force growth of changes in net
migration and participation rate is inversely associated with the unemployment rate. For
1880-1965, the correlation is - .83 (Easterlin 1968, 151-53,257).547 Major Changes in Cyclical Behavior
1983, for example, almost exactly the same percentage ofthe \\torking-
age population (sixteen years and over) 'was employed as in 1973,
namely 58.3%. (In these calculations, employment includes resident
armed forces.) Other data, such as real personal income per capita or
real compensation perhour, indicate that both years were about equally
prosperous, but the unemployment rate in 1983 was nearly twice as
high as in 1973,9.5% compared with 4.8%. Ifcalculated as a percentage
ofthe working-age populationinstead ofthe laborforce, unemployment
was more than twice as high, 6.1% compared with 2.9%. What hap-
pened was that a massive shift occurred in the population's disposition
to seekjobs. This pushed up the unemployment rate but did not signify
any greatchangein the availability ofjobspercapita, which is measured
by the employment percentage. Since the two measures do not always
give the same message regarding employmentconditions, itis important
to consider both in evaluating the severity of recessions.
9.8 Changing Sources of Personal Income and the Business Cycle
According to annual estimates by Crearrler (1956, 126), personal in-
come in constant dollars fell during five business contractions and rose
during three in the period 1910-38. The average ofthese changes was
- 5.0%. Corresponding annual measures for the eight business con-
tractions of 1948-82, based on the present Department of Commerce
data, show a reverse picture: three declines and five rises, averaging
+0.7%. Hence, real income has becomefar more stableduring business
cycles since World War II than before.
The composition of personal income by major types and sources
shows that several long-term shifts have contributed to this increasing
stability (tables 9.9 and 9.10). Wage and salary disbursements of gov-
ernment rose most ofthe time, accounting for 5% to 6% oftotal income
in the business cycle peak years 1913 and 1929 but more than twice as
much-II% to 14%-in the peak years of 1953-81. Transfer payments
rose most strongly and persistently, from less than 1% of the total in
1929 and before to 19% in 1981. The relative decline in farmers' income,
from 10% in 1913 to 1% in 1981, was slow in the first halfofthe period
covered, rapid in the second half. Nonfarm proprietors' income also
fell decisively in relative terms, from 15% to 4%. Wages and salaries
in the private sector, by far the largest component ofpersonal income,
increased from 48% in 1913 to 58% in 1953~, then fell back again to 48%
in 1981.
Ofthe types ofproperty income, the shares oftwo show downward
trends: dividends (6%-7% in 1913-17,2%-4% thereafter) and, partic-
ularly, rent (from 11% down to 1% between 1913 and 1981). The pro-




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.549 Major Changes in Cyclical Behavior
the peak years 1913-53 but grew from 6% in 1960 to 8% in 1969, then
rose rapidly to 13% in 1981 during the period of high inflation.
Table 9.10 classifies these types of income into two groups: those
that have been relatively recession-proof and those that have been
recession-prone. In general, the categories \vhose shares increased have
been relatively recession-proof (interest, rental income) or even coun-
tercyclical (transfers), whereas the categories whose shares drifted
mostly downward have been generally recession-prone (proprietors'
incomes and wages of private workers). Income of government em-
ployees and transfer payments did not decline even in the severe
depression of 1937-38 and neither did rent, while the downturn in
interest income was moderate. Although dividends fell sharply in 1937-
38, they often resisted the milder recessions in the post-World War II
period (but note their drop in 1981-82). L,abor income in the private
sector typically declined at least moderately in recessions, mainly ow-
ing to wages. It should be noted that the measures for 1937-38 and
1948-49 (cols. 1 and 2) are based on data in current dollars, the mea-
sures for the 1948-80 averages and 1981-82 (cols. 3 and 4) on data in
constant dollars. It was, ofcourse, necessary to adjust the recentfigures
for the effects ofhigh inflation that masked the cyclicality ofthe nominal
income series during most of the post-World War II era.
Suppose the cyclical changes in each of the sources of personal
income were as observed and taken to be independent of the shifts in
the distribution of the aggregate. How would the changes in the com-
position ofincome by sources influence the movements oftotal income
underthis assumption? The answergiven by the estimates in the bottom
section of table 9.10 is "strongly." For example, had the relative im-
portance ofthe main categories ofincome been the same in 1981 as in
1948, the reweighted decline of real personal income during the 1981-
82 recession would have been 4.3% instead ofthe actual 0.7% (col. 4).
Using the 1948 weights would have doubled the relative amplitude of
the average decline in real personal income in the seven recessions of
1948-80, from the observed 1.1% to the estimated 2.3% (col. 3). Con-
versely, the 1937-38 decline, which was actually 7.7%, would have
been ceteris paribus only 4. I% under the distributional conditions of
1960 and 1.2% under those of 198I (col. I)!
To be sure, hypothetical calculations ofthis type must be interpreted
with great caution. The critical assumption that the amplitude ofincome
change for each category is independent of the compositional shifts
could be undermined by various factors. Forexample, transfer incomes
may support consumption, but their strong upward trend, with its im-
plication of rising tax burdens, may at some point damage business
confidence and investment. The rising share ofinterest income reflects
increasing and high interest rates, which again can have strong adverse550 Victor Zarnowitz/GeotTrey H. Moore
Table 9.10 Estimated Effects of Shifts in Types of Income on Cyclical Stability










1937-38 1948-49 1948-80 1981-82
(I) (2) (3) (4)
Categories declining
most in recessions
Wages and salaries, private -10.2 -2.2 -3.4 -3.9
Farm proprietors' income -21.4 -27.7 -13.0 -22.1
Nonfarm proprietors' income -4.5 -2.3 -4.7 -1.8
All of the above -10.7 -5.1 -4.1 -4.1
Categories declining
least in recessions
Wages and salaries, government + 11.0 +9.0 +2.1 + 1.8
Other labor income and
transfer payments +20.8 + 10.5 + 12.3 +6.5
Dividends -31.9 +4.2 -0.5 -13.5
Interest -2.8 +9.8 +6.2 +3.8
Net rent +6.5 +2.7 + 1.9 -5.8
All of the above -0.5 +7.9 +5.8 +4.0
Total personal income
Actual -7.7 -1.9 - 1.1 -0.7
Estimated, using
1913 weights (table 9.9, col. I) -8.3 -2.8 -3.0 -5.5
1937 weights (table 9.9, col. 3) -7.7 -1.4 -2.3 -4.5
1948 weights (table 9.9, col. 4) -6.7 -1.9 -2.3 -4.3
1960 weights (table 9.9, col. 6) -4.1 +0.7 -0.7 -2.4
1981 weights (table 9.9, col. 8) -1.2 +3.0 + 1.4 -0.6
Note: Percentage changes in 1937-38 and 1948-49 based on Creamer 1956, xxix; in 1948-
80 and 1981-82 based on Cullity 1983, table 2. Also see text and table 9.9.
effects on government finance, security markets, and, most important,
real capital formation by business firms and households. The expansion
ofgovernment employment, in relative as well as absolute terms, con-
tributes to the taxpayers' burden. And there are still other possible
complications that the simple global estimates in table 9.10 neglect: it
may be important to separate the effects of changing compensation
rates and input volumes and to take account of finer distinctions, for
example, the relative importance of durables, nondurables, and ser-
vices in generating personal income. These qualifications were already
made by Creamer and Moore in 1956.551 Major Changes in Cyclical Behavior
Nevertheless, as projected in that VOlUITle nearly thirty years ago,
fluctuations in income that accompany business cycles did moderate
significantly, and there can be little doubt that the trends in the com-
position of personal income by major types and sources made a sub-
stantial contribution to this development.]2
9.9 Growth Rates and Variability of Economic Change
Although it is true for the period since 1945 as a whole that con-
tractions have become shorter and milder, there is nonetheless a useful
distinction to be made between the first two decades and the next one.
In the 1950s and 1960s high long-term growth rates prevailed in the
United States economy as well as among its major trading partners.
Domestically, high inflation was not yet perceived to be a persistent
and grave problem with no easy, apparent solution, and neither was
high unemployment so perceived. Looking back, contemporaries had
little doubt about the contrast between these economically rather placid
and prosperous decades and the turbulent times that followed, domi-
nated by seemingly uncontrollable inflation, more frequent and serious
recessions, energy problems, and financial instability.
To put such impressionistic comparisons on firmer ground, table 9.11
divides the United States economic record since 1903 into six periods,
each covering from two to four complete business cycles measured
from peak to peak. Three of these show average annual growth rates
in real GNP (g) varying from 3.4% to 3.9~~: 1903-13, 1923-29, and
1948-69. The otherthree are characterized by considerably lower long-
term growth ranging from 2.4% to 2.8% per year: 1913-23, 1929-48,
and 1969-81 (col. 7).13
To measure relatively high and low economic stability, we use stan-
dard deviations of the annual growth rates in real GNP (w). It turns
out that variability in growth was generally greaterin the slowergrowth
periods (cols. 7 and 8). In addition, the more recent periods in both
groups showed less variability than the earlier periods, confirming the
point made above regarding the reduced severity of recessions since
World War 11.]4
It is also of interest to observe that the proportion of time spent in
contraction was 15% in 1948-69 and 24% in 1969-81. Even this last
figure is much lower than the corresponding statistics for the earlier
12. For further evidence, particularly concerning the role ofgovernment expenditures
and transfer payments, see Beck 1980 and Cullity 1983.
13. See Zarnowitz (1981,476-80) for a discussion ofhow these periods were selected,
references to related literature, and an attempt to push the comparison back to 1882.
14. Both 1913-23 and 1929-48 include large wartime expansions as well as major
depressions (with the latter outweighing the former as regards growth effects but all



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.553 Major Changes in Cyclical Behavior
periods (cf. cols. 4-6). These measures indicate no correspondence
between the average growth rates and the relative duration of con-
tractions. Thus in 1903-13 and 1923-29, when growth was relatively
high, the percentage of time accounted for by business contractions
exceeded that in 1929-48 and 1969-81, periods with lower growth
rates.
Strong inflationary trends prevailed in 1913-23 and 1969-81, when
monetary aggregates expanded rapidly but real growth was relatively
weak. In the other periods, inflation was fairly moderate or absent.
Table 9.12 shows the average annual growth rates (%) in real income,
the stock ofmoney, nominal income, and the implicit price deflator (g,
m, y, and p, respectively. 15 The periods with relatively high real growth
(on the left) had on the average lower In, y, and p rates than the periods
with lower real growth (on the right).
9.10 Changes in the Cyclical Behavior of Prices
Reference cycle patterns provide a simple and useful device for de-
scribing the movements of a series during business cycles. The series
is divided into segments, each ofwhich covers one business cycle dated
from the initial to the final trough. A pattern consists ofnine averages,
one for each of the consecutive stages of the cycle. Stages I, V, and
IX are three-month periods centered on the initial trough, peak, and
terminal trough of a business cycle, respectively. Stages II, III, and
IV cover successivethirds ofthe expansion (trough to peak), and stages
VI, VII, and VIII cover similar portions of the contraction (peak to
trough). All measures are in "reference cycle relatives," that is, per-
centages of the average standing of the data during the given business
cycle. The procedure retains the intracycle trend but eliminates the
Table 9.12 Average Annual Growth Rates of Real and Nominal Income,
the Money Supply, and the Implicit Deflator
Years g m y p Years g m y p
1903-13 3.4 6.1 5.4 2.0 1913-23 2.4 8.8 8.2 4.9
1923-29 3.5 4.1 3.4 -0.2 1929-48 2.5 5.3 4.2 2.0
1948-69 3.9 4.7 6.2 2.3 1969-81 2.8 9.7 10.0 7.0
Average 3.7 5.0 5.0 1.4 Average 2.6 7.9 7.5 4.6
15. The measures for 1903-48 are calculated from annual data listed in Friedman and
Schwartz 1982, table 4 (following p. 121). They refer to the sum ofcurrency held by the
public plus adjusted deposits at all commercial banks; national income or net national
product; and the corresponding implicit price deflator. The measures for 1969-82 are
based on data on M2, GNP, and IPD as given in the Economic Report of the President,
February 1984,220,224, and 291.554 Victor Zarnowitz/Geoffrey H. Moore
intercycle trend because the average relative for each cycle is one
hundred. Note that reference cycle stages differ in duration, as do the
individual business cycles. For certain purposes, therefore, such as
comparisons of leads and lags at turning points, measures in fixed
calendar-time units may be preferable. But an analysis ofthe patterns
can be very revealing in some contexts. This is so in particular with
respect to the identification of any major and persistent changes in
broadly defined cyclical movements, which is our concern here.
We have plotted and inspected thirty reference patterns for United
States wholesale prices, one for each of the complete business cycles
since 1854. The first impression is one ofgreat variability, but a closer
analysis helps to explain the main differences and bring out the more
persistent traits. The intracycle portions ofthe longer trends are often
strong enough to have pronounced and readily visible effects. Thus in
1854-61 a downward local drift came to dominate the longer upswing
in prices, and then between 1864 and 1896 there was a long downswing
that, however, flattened temporarily in 1885-91. 16 Accordingly, the
seven patterns covering the periods 1854-61, 1867-85, and 1891-97
have clear downward tilts. Between 1896 and 1920 prices tended to
move up, with some leveling offin 1910-14. This left an impress upon
the several corresponding patterns. The weakness of prices in 1920-
32 shows up in the downward-tilted patterns for this period, and their
subsequent upward trend in the upward-tilted patterns for the post-
1933 cycles.
Major wars had huge effects on the behavior ofprices. The patterns
for 1861-67 (stages I-IV), 1914-19 (I-VI), and 1945-49 (I-IV) show
the surging inflations ofthe Civil War and World War I and the slower,
more suppressed inflation ofWorld War II. The inflations ofthe Korean
War and Vietnam War are much less conspicuous in the patterns for
1949-54 (III-V) and 1961-70 (III-IX). After the Civil War, a strong
deflation followed immediately; after World War I, prices first stabilized
and then fell sharply in the 1920-21 depression; but no strong down-
ward movements in the price level trailed any of the later wars.
The most important findings are as follows. Virtually all business
cycle contractions through 1938 were associated with some declines in
prices during at least some of their stages. When the trend was down,
these declines would often start during the expansions and last longer,
but they would also typically accelerate after the peak stage (V). When
the trend was up, the rising segments ofthe patterns tended to be larger
and longer, frequently starting before the trough and extending beyond
16. For the chronology of the ""long waves" in prices, see table 9.2. On the shorter
""local" trends superimposed on these waves, see Burns and Mitchell 1946,438-40 with
chart 65.555 Major Changes in Cyclical Behavior
the peak, but the contractions would still witness some significant price-
level declines (mainly between stages VI and IX). The only early pat-
terns that show very weak and irregular price movements, in the 1885-
91 period, referto two shortand marginal cycles, an interludeofrelative
stability separating majorfluctuations dominated by strong deflationary
developments in the early 1880s and 1890s.
The more recent cycles present a sharply contrasting picture. The
briefand peculiar end-of-the-war contraction of 1945 was accompanied
by essentially flat wholesale prices. This year saw the end of wartime
price controls. The last contractionduring which prices fell significantly
occurred in 1948-49. The Korean expansion saw new partial wage and
price controls and had a phase in 1951 during which prices declined
considerably, but in the ensuing contraction they merely stabilized after
a new bout of wartime inflation. The stability persisted through most
of the 1954-57 expansion, too, but prices started rising again moder-
ately late in the 1957-58 contraction and during the short recovery of
1958-60, which alarmed many observers since there was little evidence
of excess demand. This ended with the recession of 1960, and several
years of relatively stable prices followed. ~Vith the intensification of
the Vietnam War in the mid-1960s, a new and much more intensive
round of inflation began, which the 1970 recession and the 1971 wage
and price controls slowed down only a little and for only a short time.
After the series of supply shocks in 1973-74 (sharp rises in prices of
food, oil, and other raw materials worldwide, termination of United
States price controls, and aftereffects ofthe switch to floating exchange
rates), inflation accelerated strongly late in the 1973-75 recession and
again in the middle stages of the 1975-80 expansion, partly owing to
new supply shocks. It took a protracted period of poor business con-
ditions in the early 1980s (two contractions separated by a weak one-
year recovery) to reduce the pace ofinflation substantially. As a group,
the post-World War II patterns, marked by an absence of any major
absolute declines in prices, are strikingly differentfrom any comparably
large subset ofearlierpatterns where deflation associated with business
contractions was the rule.
By averaging the individual reference patterns stage by stage over
some sufficiently long period, one may hope to bring out the typical
features in the cyclical behavior of the variable concerned. The as-
sumption underlying the procedure is that such persistent traits indeed
exist; the more valid this premise is, the more useful the method.
The upper panel in figure 9.1 shows five average reference cycle
patterns based on the measures for the overall wholesale price series
used in figure 9.1. The first pattern, for the nine cycles of 1854-97,
reflects weak rises during expansion and strong declines during con-
traction: the typical behavior in a period of long-run downward trend556 Victor Zarnowitz/Geoffrey H. Moore
in prices. The second, for the five cycles of 1897-1914, when the long
drift was up, shows a longer and stronger rise and weaker decline. The
third, for 1919-38 (five cycles), shows very large and more symmetrical
cyclical movements, with a relatively small downward tilt. The average
for the nineteen cycles, 1854-1938, omitting the war-related episodes,
is a nearly symmetrical, slightly downward-tilted pattern rising between
each of the stages I-V and falling between each of the stages V-IX.
In clear contrast, the averages for the seven cycles 1949-82 describe
a steadily rising pattern, although one whose slope is definitely lower
in the contraction segment V-IX than in the expansion segment I-V.
In this period the contractions were associated with a lower, but not
a negative, rate of inflation. Similar results for the period since 1919
are obtained from an analysis of the index of wholesale prices for
industrial commodities only (omitting farm products and foods). The
average reference patterns for 1919-38 and 1949-82 closely resemble
their counterparts for the all-commodity index.
Cagan (1975,90) concluded that "The failure ofthe aggregate index
of wholesale prices to decline in the recessions of 1954 and 1958 and
then again in 1961, which contrasted with the sharp declines ofprevious
recessions, was a new phenomenon." Our results confirm this obser-
vation on the basis of longer series than those used by Cagan (his
measures cover the period 1891-1970; ours cover 1854-1982).
It has been suggested that the post-1969 change in the observed
behavior was due to the convergence ofdownward rigidities owing to
the increased market power of firms over prices and of labor unions
over wages. Whether such developments did in fact occur on a suffi-
ciently large scale has been questioned by some authors but accepted
by others (Cagan 1975,90; DeLong and Summers, this volume, chap.
12). Another hypothesis is that after the Employment Act of 1946 the
successive administrations demonstrated their commitment to com-
bating unemployment so that people came to believe that contractions
long or severe enough to generate any persistent deflationary move-
ments would be effectively prevented. This explanation, which appears
to be generally consistent with the evidence, is closely related to the
more recent emphasis on the effect of a credible policy posture on
expectations of changes in the price level (Fellner 1980).
It is difficult to measure anticipated rates of inflation, but their role
is undoubtedly basic. Cagan compared the average annual rates of
change in wholesale prices during the successive expansions and con-
tractions (to be denoted E and C) and computed the differences C - E.
This procedure amounts to using the preceding expansion rates as
(admittedly rough) proxies for the anticipations. In table 9.13 we bring
Cagan's results up to date. After 1949, prices ceased declining during
contractions: the signs ofC change from negative to positive (see cols.557 Major Changes in Cyclical Behavior
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Fig. 9.1 Wholesale prices, all commodities, average reference pat-
terns, 1854-1982. Source: Warren/Pearson (1854-90); U.S.
DepartmentofLabor, BureauofLaborStatistics (1890-1982).558 Victor Zarnowitz/Geoffrey H. Moore
3 and 6). The differences C - E have consistently negative signs in
the seventeen cycles from 1891 to 1958 (cols. 4 and 7). The Crates,
even where positive or zero as in 1945, 1953-54, and 1957-58, were
smaller than the E rates. In the four cycles between 1958 and 1980,
however, the C - E differences turned positive as well. 17 The price
response measured in these terms declined consistently in each ofthe
six successive business cycles 1945-75. Only in 1980-82 did C - E
result in a negative sign, marking a decidedly disinflationary phase
(col. 7).
The wholesale price data make it clear that the magnitude of the
post-World War II inflation in the United States was due not to an
intensification of upward price pressures during business expansions,
but to the increased length of expansions and the new persistence of
such pressures during contractions. The average percentage increases
of prices per year were very similar in the prewar and postwar expan-
sions (6.3% and 6.4% during 1891-1945 and 1945-82, respectively) but
very different in the prewar and postwar contractions (-6.4% and
3.3%, respectively).
Prices have been very sensitive to the severity of business contrac-
tions. In 1891-1945 the wholesale price index fell at an average annual
rate of 15% in the five major depressions (MD), 4% in the four severe
recessions (SR), and 0.6% in the four mild recessions (MR). The cor-
responding average differences C - E, in percentage points, are -21,
-12, and -6. In 1945-82 there were no major depressions, but in the
five severe recessions the price index rose 2% per year, and in the
three mild recessions it rose 5%. The C - E differential was - 6 for
the five SR and + 1.6 for the three MR. Thus in both periods prices
were responsive to the severity ofbusiness declines, but it is clear that
the response to recessions of comparable severity decreased
substantially.
Detailed studies ofwholesale price changes in the nonwar recessions
of the 1920s and 1948-70 (Cagan 1975) indicate that these results are
not attributable to the changing composition of the index. However,
many raw materials prices retained their usually high cyclical sensitivity.
In a recent analysis ofa broad spectrum ofprice and wage series for
selected periods (1900-1914, 1923-29, and 1949-66), Schultze (1981)
argued that until the 1960s low inflation''norms" in the nature ofinert
rules ofthumb dominated price-level expectations and behavior. In his
comments on Schultze's paper, Fellner (577-81) disputed this hypoth-
esis partly on the grounds that Schultze's sample includes mainly years
17. It should be remembered that these measures are averages in percent per year.
Taking into account the different durations ofexpansions and contractions and the length-
ening lags in prices, it is still true that some disinflation accompanied or followed each










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.560 Victor Zarnowitz/Geoffrey H. Moore
in which prices had a mild upward trend (in 1923-29 there was a slight
downward drift). Had longer and more continuous price series been
used, they would have demonstrated more flexible behavior and sup-
ported the concept of more "rational" expectations. Indeed, the pre-
1920 patterns (see fig. 9.1) seem to us to be broadly consistent with
this view.
9.11 Changes in the Cyclical Behavior of Interest Rates
Short-term interest rates historically have exhibited cyclical move-
ments varying from moderate to very large relative to their average
levels. During business cycles containing major booms or slumps and
affected by financial crises, large monetary disturbances, or wars, fluc-
tuations in rates have often been huge and sudden. Financial markets
are particularly sensitive to all types of factors influencing business
conditions, so it is well known and not surprising that short rates are
typically more volatile than most otherimportant variables. This is well
established by an analysis of twenty-seven reference cycle patterns
that covers more than 120 years of United States business history.
The patterns for commercial paper rates, 1858-1932, show clear
procyclical movements, consistent with the simple notion that the de-
mand for credit tends to increase relative to supply in expansions and
decrease in contractions. The single major exception was the long but
slow 1933-37 recovery from the worst recorded depression, during
which short rates continued to drop sharply. However, the character-
istic timing ofthe rates was predominately lagging, particularly at peaks.
Rough coincidences prevailed only at the peaks of 1860-73 and 1923-
29. At troughs, the timing was on the average lagging as well but much
less consistently so. A few of the patterns (1861-67 and 1888-91 in
addition to those related to the depressions of 1920-21 and the 1930s)
are quite different from all the others.
The patterns for the three-month treasury bill rate in the seven busi-
ness cycles 1949-82 have very large amplitudes, which bespeaks
heightened sensitivity to cyclical influences. 18 They rise sharply during
expansions and fall sharply during contractions, but with much vari-
ability in timing. Thus their highest standings are in stages IV (for the
1958-61 cycle), V (1949-54, 1961-70, and 1980-82), VI (1954-58 and
1975-80), and VII (1970-75). Ofcourse in the post-World War II period
interest rates generally had rising long-term trends; the.se were mild in
the 1950s and 1960s and strong thereafter, reflecting mainly the course
of inflation and the corresponding adjustments of price expectations.
18. Treasury bill rates have become a particularly important and sensitive indicator
of money market conditions. Commercial paper rates have somewhat different charac-
teristics than they used to have (Selden 1963), but their reference cycle patterns since
1949 bear a fair family resemblance to the treasury bill rate patterns.561 Major Changes in Cyclical Behavior
In basis points, the fluctuations in interest rates were very small until
the late 1960s, then steadily increased to very large size. It is interesting
that the amplitudes ofthe corresponding patterns do not show a similar
trend. That is, relative to their average values in each cycle the move-
ments ofbill rates have been about the same in recent cycles as in the
1950s and 1960s, whereas in terms of basis points they were small in
the early years when the levels of the rates were low and large in the
late years when the levels of the rates were high.
The average reference cycle patterns in figure 9.2 bring out the shifts
in amplitude and timing. There is a near synlmetry ofmovement in the
diagram for the four earliest cycles covered (1858-79). The averages
for the eleven cycles of 1879-1919 show a rise from stage II to VI-
VII and a contraction between stages VII and II, that is, lags at both
peaks and troughs. The patternfor the five cyclesof1919-38is strongly
downward-tilted, with a rise between stages III and V only (a long lag
at troughs). These movements have been large enough to put a strong
imprint on the overall averages (compare the patterns for 1919-38 and
1858-1938). In contrast, the diagram for the treasury bill rate in seven
cycles, 1949-82, shows a very large rise between stages I and VI and
a somewhat smaller decline in the contraction stages VI-IX. The av-
erage swing in bill rates since 1949 has been much larger than the
average swing in commercial paper rates before 1938.
It is common knowledge that long-term interest rates fluctuate much
less than short-term rates; it is perhaps not so well known that they
do not conform as well to business cycles. Both properties can be
inferred from.a comparison of the corresponding reference patterns.
In 1900-1914, for example, the only large cyclical movements evident
in high-grade industrial bond yields are those associated with the crisis
and severe depression of 1907: first a rise in stages III-VII ofthe 1904-
8 cycle, then a decline continuing through most of the recovery from
that depression. A somewhat similar sequence occurred in connection
with the depression of 1920-21 and the subsequent recovery. The large
irregular movements in the great contraction of 1929-33 with a late
peak in stage VIII (1931), and the long, first rapid then slow decline
throughout the 1933-38 cycle are also notable episodes.
The corporate bond yield patterns for the post-World War II years
contain some very large shifts, mostly upward. The timing of these
movements has varied widely, with rises occurring between the fol-
lowing stages in each consecutive cycle:
Cycles: 1949-53 1954-58 1958-61 1961-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-82
StaRes: I-V I-VI I-IV II-VII III-VII III-VI VIII-VI
Consistent with the generally rising trend in yields, lags occurred more
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Fig. 9.2 Short-term interest rates, average reference patterns, 1858-
1982. Source: commercial paper rates, New York City, Ma-
caulay; treasury bill rate, Board ofGovernors ofthe Federal
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Fig. 9.2 (continued)
The average reference patterns in figure 9.3 provide a bird's-eyeview.
The overall amplitudes ofmovement in long rates have increased greatly
between 1900-38 and 1954-82, but it is the strong upward trend in the
recent period that dominates the average patterns. The intracycle drift
tended to be down in the period between the world wars, strongly up
in the past thirty years. Nevertheless, tht~ lapping tendency can be
traced throughout the twenty-seven-cycle record.
Cagan (1966), comparing the behavior of a broad group of interest
rates before World War I, the 1920s, and the 1950s, noted that they
may have become increasingly sensitive, conforming to moderate busi-
ness cycles with largeramplitudes and shortc~rlags. Ourreference cycle
patterns are not inconsistent with this result. Table 9.14 indicates that
a shift in timing toward shorter lags and more frequent leads did occur564 Victor Zarnowitz/Geoffrey H. Moore
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Fig. 9.3 Long-term interest rates, average references patterns, 1858-
1982. Source: railroad bond yields, Macaulay; industrial bond
yields, Standard and Poor's Corporation; corporate bond
yields, Citibank and U.S. Department of the Treasury.565 l'vlajor Changes in Cyclical Behavior
in the early post-World War II period (1945-60), but that later the lags
reasserted themselves. In 1961 -82 the lags were generally longer than
in 1919-29, for example. The lags of bond yields behind bill rates also
increased between these two periods (compare the first and fourth lines
in the "Averages" section). On the whole, lags have prevailed heavily
in the timing at troughs for both bills and bonds, but at peaks bills
usually led while bonds lagged. The individual timing comparisons
show a high degree of dispersion.
9.12 Changes in the Timing of Leading and Lagging Indicators
Since the 1960s, a collection of economic indicators that systemat-
ically lead, coincide with, or lag business cycle turning points has
become widely used in current economic analysis. The selection of
these indicators has been based upon historical measures of the kind
employed earlier in this paper, as well as upon hypotheses ofeconomic
behavior that yield plausible explanations of the observed leads and
lags. Here we examine the historical record of two of the selected
groups ofindicators with respect to their tirning at business cycle peaks
and troughs.
The longest available record of the timing of the leading and lagging
indicators during business cycles covers nearly a century. In tables 9.15
and 9.16 the median leads or lags of speecific groups of indicators are
shown for each business cycle turn between 1885 and 1982. The in-
dicators in the leading group show an unbroken record of leads, while
those in the lagging group lag at all except t\VO peaks and three troughs.
Moreover, when the turns in the lagging group are compared with the
opposite turns in the business cycle, they lead at every turn, and by
longer intervals than the leading indicators do. The economic relations
between the lagging and the leading indicators are such as to make
these results reasonable, according to the considerable literature that
has been devoted to the subject (for a sumrnary and list of references,
see Moore 1983a, chap. 21).
From 1885 to 1938, the timing record is based upon seventy-five
leading and thirty lagging indicators, the classification having been de-
termined in 1950. Since the classification was based on the prior record,
it is not surprising that the leading group led and the lagging group
lagged. But the consistency over the entire period was not controlled
by the n1ethod of classification, nor was the relations between the
opposite turns in the lagging and leading groups. For the period 1948
to 1982, the record was based upon twelve leading and six lagging
indicators selected in 1975. Again the prior record was examined in
making the selection. As has been shown elsewhere, however, the














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.570 Victor Zarnowitz/Geoffrey H. Moore
the subsequent record, was quite similar during 1948-75 to the record
shown in tables 9.15 and 9.16 (Moore 1983a, chap. 24).
At business cycle peaks the average length of lead of the leading
group, 1885-1982, was seven months, with a standard deviation ofsix
months. At troughs the mean and standard deviation were about half
as large, four and three months, respectively. There is some evidence
in the tables that the leads at peaks have become longer and the leads
at troughs shorter since 1948 than before (see below).
The lags ofthe lagging group average five months at peaks and seven
months at troughs, with standard deviations of four and five months,
respectively. When the turns in the lagging group are compared with
the opposite turns in the business cycle, the leads that emerge are quite
long, averaging twenty-one months at peaks and ten months at troughs.
They are also quite variable, with standard deviations oftwelve months
at peaks and eight months at troughs.
What tables 9.15 and 9.16 reveal, then, is an almost unbroken se-
quence of turning points during successive business cycles over the
past hundred years. In view ofour finding in section 9.3 that the prin-
cipal shift in the length ofbusiness cycle phases took place after World
War II, it is ofinterest to examine the sequence before and after 1945,
as in the following summary:
A. Business cycle peak to peak in lagging
indicators
B. Peak in lagging indicators to trough in
leading indicators
C. Trough in leading indicators to business
cycle trough
D. Business cycle trough to trough in lag-
ging indicators
E. Trough in lagging indicators to peak in
leading indicators
F. Peak in leading indicators to business
cycle peak
A + B + C. Business cycle contraction
D + E + F. Business cycle expansion










Each of the intervals into which the business cycle contraction is
broken by these turning points has become shorter, on average, while
each of the intervals that constitute the business cycle expansion has
become longer. This in itself supports the finding of a major shift in
the length of business expansions vis-a-vis contractions, since the in-
tervals between the indicator turning points (though not their sum) are
independent of the business cycle chronology.571 Major Changes in Cyclical Behavior
One other noteworthy feature oftables 9.15 and 9.16 is the evidence
that the lengths of the leads or lags at successive turning points are
positively correlated. The correlation coefficients (r) are as follows:
At business cycle peaks, /887-/98/
Trough in lagging and peak in leading
Peak in lagging and peak in leading
At business cycle troughs, /885-1982
Peak in lagging and trough in leading













The correlations are not high, but they are all positive, and they are
about as high when opposite turns are compared as when like turns
are compared. This gives some support to the hypothesis that cyclical
influences run from the lagging to the leading indicators as well as from
the leading to the lagging indicators (see :Moore 1983a, chap. 23).
Apart from the shift toward shorterrecessions and longer expansions
and the associated shift in the intervals between turns in the indicators,
the most notable feature ofthe record is the absence ofmajor changes
in the timing relationships among the groups of indicators.
9.13 Summary and Conclusions
1. After World War II business cycle expansions in the United States
became much longer and recessions much shorter than before. From
1846 to 1945, expansions were one and a half times as long as reces-
sions. From 1945 to 1982, they were four times as long. Recessions
also became more uniform in length. Total cycle durations from peak
to peak or trough to trough show no significant trend.
2. Historically, expansions have long beenrelative to recessions when
the long-run trend in prices was upward and shorter when the price
trend was downward. This is mainly because expansions generate more
upward pressure on prices than recessions do. However, we find no
association between the rate of inflation during each business cycle
and the relative duration of the phases.
3. Business cycle recessions since World War II have been much
less severe than before, as indicated by comprehensive measures of
employment, production, and real incorne. Shifts in the industrial
composition of employment, changes relating to unemployment and
labor force participation, and trends in the distribution of personal
income by major sources and types have all contributed to that
moderation.572 Victor Zarnowitz/Geoffrey H. Moore
4. Inflation was much higher in 1969-81 than in 1948-69, whereas
real growth on the average was lower. In the past, periods ofrelatively
low long-termgrowth tended to have relatively high variability ofannual
growth rates. However, the variability ofeconomic change (measured
by standard deviations of real GNP growth rates) can be judged low
by historical standards in both 1948-69 and 1969-81.
5. The average rates ofinflation were very similarin the United States
expansions before and after 1945 but much higher in the postwar than
in the prewar contractions. The inflation of recent decades can be
attributed principally to the (novel) persistence of upward price pres-
sures in contractions, not to an intensification of such pressures in
expansions. Wholesale prices have continued to show considerable
sensitivity to the degree of severity of business contractions.
6. Short-term interest rates moved with very large relative ampli-
tudes, high positive conformity, and variable timing in the business
cycles of 1949-82. Before World War II their movements tended to be
smaller relative to the cycle average, and they often had long lags at
turning points. Long-term rates continued to lag behind the short rates
most of the time and to show much smaller amplitudes of movement
and lower conformity to business cycles.
7. The longest available record of the cyclical timing of leading and
lagging indicators covers nearly a century. Apart from a shift toward
shorter recessions and longer expansions and the associated shift in
the intervals between turns in the indicators, the most notable feature
ofthe record is the absence ofmajorchanges in the timing relationships
among the groups of indicators.
We conclude that various structural, institutional, and policy changes
contributed to the evolution ofbusiness cycles. The process is contin-
uing. There have been important changes, yet the most basic charac-
teristics and many outward manifestations ofthe business cycle remain
much the same (as illustrated by the timing sequences ofthe indicators).
The cyclical processes are sometimes stretched out and sometimes
compressed, depending on long-term trends in growth, inflation, and
so forth, as well as on the nature, size, and frequency of outside
disturbances.
More intensive research is very much needed on each of the topics
we could address only briefly in this overview. In addition, there are
other aspects ofthe changing nature ofbusiness cycles that we had to
exclude. The most important of these are international. For example,
greaterconformity ofUnited States exports to business cycles in recent
times has been noted by Mintz (1967) and Moore (1983a). Business
cycles, and even major fluctuations in positive growth rates, appear to
be rather integrated among the industrialized trading countries. The
full implications of this fact remain to be analyzed.573 Major Changes in Cyclical Behavior
Comment Alan J. Auerbach
Zarnowitz and Moore present a wealth ofdata on output, employment,
prices, and interest rates from the past century, using the business
cycle as the unit of time over which these data are broken down,
studied, and related. The broad question to which the authors seek an
answer is, How has the character ofthe business cycle changed, both
in terms of the behavior of macroeconomic aggregates over the cycle
and in terms of the frequency, severity, and longevity of the cycles
themselves? The answer is that the post-"World War II business cycle
has been less severe than before, with expansions lasting longer and
contractions just the opposite. Part ofthis change is associated with a
secular shift in outputfrom industries with a strongly cyclical character,
such as manufacturing, to those less sensitive to the cycle, such as
government. Likewise, the contributions to personal income from such
volatile sources as farming and unincorporated business have declined
as transfer income, many parts of which are intentionally counter-
cyclical, was rising. I use the word ~~associated" here rather than
caused, because without a specific model or explanation for macroeco-
nomic activity itself, it is really impossible to determine causality from
these observed correlations. The authors are usually careful to rec-
ognize these limitations, although it is difficult to divorce one's view
of the way the world works from the way data are presented and
analyzed. I do not wish to offer a blanket criticism of ~~measurement
without theory," if for no other reason than that the associated argu-
ments are by now so well known. Basic information on statistical re-
lationships may be useful and relevant for a number of theories. At
certain points, however, I believe the data could have been presented
in a more helpful way.
The paper begins with a summary of business cycle activity since
1846, based on figures presented in table 9.1. Here it is evident that,
according to the NBER dating of cycles preferred by the authors,
contractions have occupied successively less time in the overall busi-
ness cycle. At this point it is probably appropriate to consider the
usefulness of the business cycle as the unit of analysis. Why not, for
example, give statistics on average annual output changes over suc-
cessive ten-year periods? The authors do not offer any explicit justi-
fication for their approach, but there must be an implicit view that
whatever model is appropriate for describing the economy, dynamic
relationships change over time according to what is happening within
the business cycle. Two specific arguments in this vein are that eco-
nomic relationships differ during expansions and contractions or that
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as business cycles change in length the unit ofcalendartime appropriate
for dynamic relationships also changes. Support for this latter view is
given in section 9.12, where we see that as the length of contractions
has shortened overtime, there has been a relatively uniform shortening
ofthe subperiods into which contractions are divided. The same is true
in reverse for expansions and their subperiods.
Returning to the paper's presentation ofbasic trends, we observe in
tables 9.2 and 9.3 that from an epoch during which periods of rising
and falling prices alternated, we have experienced rising prices during
the past half century. As table 9.13 shows us later in the paper, this
change in long-run price behavior is associated with the fact that prices
no longer fall during contractions rather than with more rapid inflation
during expansions. Given the additional fact that expansions now seem
to last longer, the mathematics tells us that we are experiencing more
inflation than we used to. Here the authors do come a little too close,
in my opinion, to an attribution ofcausality, in saying that this inflation
"was due not to an intensification of upward price pressures during
business expansions, but to the new persistence of pressures during
contractions." This statement may be correct, but table 9.13 reports
prices, not pressures.
After presenting the basic facts on output and price variations, the
authors seek the reasons for the cycle's changing character. They con-
centrate on shifts in output and labor force composition, adding that
demand management is another possible explanation but that this "topic
will not be pursued here." I think they are misleading us a bit. If one
looks ahead to the discussion ofpersonal income sources, one finds in
table 9.9 that included in the category ofpersonal income that declines
least during recessions is "otherlabor income and transfer payments,"
which grew from 0.9% of personal income for 1913 to 18.9% in 1981,
and "wagesand salaries, government," which grewfrom 4.6% to 11.2%
over the same period. Omitting these two sources of growth would
leave us with a very different picture of the changing composition of
personal income among volatile and nonvolatile sources.
While we are studying table 9.9, let me point out a couple of other
problems that make the trend even less obvious. Both relate to the use
ofpersonal income rather than a more comprehensive income concept.
The third important source ofstable income, according to the table, is
interest payments. But these are nominal interest payments. They may
be stable and bigger than they used to be, but the picture would be
quite different if real, realized interest payments were included. The
same type ofcorrection to include capital gains would be helpful. This
problem emphasizes that one cannot divorce statistics from models.
Unless consumers are completely myopic, or in some equivalent way
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Turning to another explanation, shifts in output composition have, I
believe, clearly contributed to the overall decline in volatility that we
have observed. Tables 9.5 and 9.6 show us that nonagricultural em-
ployment has been steadily shifting from manufacturing to services,
and that cyclical changes in employment are and have always been
much smaller in the latter sector than the former.
Finally, the authors turn from their discussion of changes in cycle
volatility to the changing behavior ofprices and interest rates over the
cycle. I have already discussed their findings about prices. I have some
difficulty in commenting on their analysis of interest rates, for it is
nominal interest rates that they study.
Hence the fact pictured in figure 9.2 that, on average, rates were higher
atthe endthan atthe beginningofthe trough-to-trough cycles since 1949
is not very surprising, but does not tell us whether the behavior ofreal
rates has changed. The same is true of the generally upward trend in
Aaa bond yields pictured in figure 9.3, although here there is also the
problem ofdisentangling the relationship between short and long rates,
something that we, as economists, have not done very well as yet. In
the study ofprices and interest rates, as well as when one looks at sources
ofpersonal income, the nose ofgovernment policy is clearly observable
under their tent, even if Zarnowitz and Moore are struggling to be in-
hospitable. They do weaken a little in section 9.10 when they present
growth ratesforthe moneystock, nominal income, andpricesoverthree
periods, but here they do not emphasize cyclical movements.
To conclude, I think that Zarnowitz and Moore have offered us an
interesting picture of the changing character of business cycles, or-
ganizing and presenting the mass of available data in a very helpful
way. They have also presented some evidence for the usefulness of
taking the business cycle as a unit of measurement, and about the
sources of observed changes in postwar cycles. I would encourage
them to present companion statistics on rates of inflation and real
interest rates to go along with those already offered on nominal interest
rates and price levels. Such additional data, combined with those al-
ready presented, could further increase our understanding ofhow busi-
ness cycles have changed during the postwar years.
Comment Solomon Fabricant
Along with Auerbach, I welcome the information Zarnowitz and Moore
provide on the changing characteristics ofbusiness cycles in the United
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States over the past century orso-and I would stress, the information
on the persistent characteristics of these cycles.
They entitle their paper ~~MajorChanges in Cyclical Behavior," but
of course it covers only some major changes, as they explicitly rec-
ognize. Other data already in their hands (to judge from this paper and
their appendix A, to this volume, on the NBER's business cycle chro-
nologies) could be analyzed or analyzed further. I hope they will do
so. And perhaps analyses along other lines could also be added.
I was somewhat surprised to find not even a reference-let alone
any discussion or analysis-to a hypothesis on cyclical changes in
cyclical behavior suggested by Burns and Mitchell almost forty years
ago (Burns and Mitchell 1946,455-64). Though they claimed only that
the hypothesis ~~may turn out to have substance," coming from these
two economists, that is enough to make the hypothesis well worth
examining-in the light ofdevelopments since World War II, and with
more data than Burns and Mitchell used in their very preliminary
investigation.
You may (and Zarnowitz and Moore will) remember that in their
1946 volume Burns and Mitchell were concerned with the variation of
cyclical behavior over time. They wanted to be reasonably confident
that the average cyclical patterns they and their colleagues were con-
structing would yield useful first approximations to the typical features
of business cycles-that changes in cyclical behavior, in other words,
were not so pronounced as to discredit the use of averages. Among
the possible changes in cyclical behavior they considered were changes
within long cycles tentatively marked off by severe depressions. In
studying the changes within these periods they observed a difference
between the cyclical behavior of industrial activity (measured by pig
iron production and deflated bank clearings) and ofspeculative activity
(bond yields, call money rates, and shares traded). The difference sug-
gested their hypothesis: ~ ~After a severe depression industrial activity
rebounds sharply, but speculation does not. The following contraction
in business is mild, which leads people to be less cautious. Conse-
quently, in the next two or three cycles, while the cyclical advances
become progressively smaller in industrial activity, they become pro-
gressively larger in speculative activity. Finally, the speculative boom
collapses and a drastic liquidation follows, which ends this cycle of
cycles."
Later, in 1955, Moore himself looked a bit further into the question
and found recoveries after severe depressions in output, employment,
and profits to be usually faster than after mild contractions (Moore
1961b, 88). In contrast, stock prices usually advanced more rapidly
after mild recessions than after severe contractions. Also relevant to
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in the quality of foreign bonds issued during the 1920s (Mintz 1951).
An analysis ofthe post-World War II period would, I suspect, turn up
some interesting parallels to that experience-and some interesting
differences.
Also surprising to me was the short shrift given-in all the confer-
ence's papers-to the changing characteristics of business cycles out-
side the United States. Even if business cycles in the United States
were our only concern, what we could learn by studying the other
countries surely would be helpful. And so would a discussion ofchanges,
if any, in the interrelations among business cycles in the United States
and those in other countries. The brief rernarks Zarnowitz and Moore
leave for the last paragraphoftheir paper can only be called tantalizing.
Of course, updating the NBER's business cycle chronologies for
other countries could be quite ajob. However, it might not be as heavy
as it seems. Many ofthe fluctuations in European countries and Japan
during their rapid economic growth follovving the war look more like
growth cycles than business cycles. And Zarnowitz and Moore have
already provided us with a chronology ofgrowth cycles for these coun-
tries, as well as the United States, in table A.8 ofappendix A. But the
table is unaccompanied byany serious analysis despite the considerable
interest expressed in growth cycles during the past fifteen or twenty
years. I In 1968, for example, Burns suggested the possibility that the
classical business cycle might be gradually merging into a cycle in which
the rate ofaggregate growth continues to fluctuate but remains positive
(Burns 1968). On this, too, the passage oftime has provided information
that could be put to use.
Apartfrom the questionofany ~~progresstoward economic stability,"
there are questions about differences between mild and severe business
cycles, and also between business cycle contractions and retardations
(or slowdowns) that are not severe enough to be designated business
cycle contractions. Well before World War I some fluctuations were so
mild as to be classified as business cycles only with some doubt. Spe-
cifically, Zarnowitz and Moore refer (table 9.1, note d) to such slow-
downs in 1869-70, 1887-88, and 1899-1900. Another example might
possibly be 1926-27. Further, in appendix A they point to changes
during 1951-52, 1962-64, and 1966-67and definitely characterize them
as retardations during expansion rather than as business cycle con-
tractions. A review of the changes during these episodes, with regard
to the characteristics on which Zarnowitz and Moore dwell (duration,
amplitude, extent of diffusion, dates of turns in leaders, etc.), could
I. This gap has been partly filled by a new NBER volume (Moore and Klein 1985)
that analyzes growth cycles and cyclical indicators in ten countries (including the United
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be interesting. And so could a review of the characteristics of the
expansion or speedup that followed a slowdown, and ofthe subsequent
~~classical" contraction-developments, for example, during 1949-52
and 1952-54, if the period 1949-54 were broken in two. All of this
would also contribute further evidence on the question that bothers
Auerbach, how useful the business cycle is Has a unit of measure-
ment"-a question that obviously also bothered Burns and Mitchell,
and to which they devoted a good deal of space in their 1946 volume.
Three things are obvious, to me at least, viewing Zarnowitz and
Moore's paper in the context of the conference as a whole. First, the
kind of business cycle research that Zarnowitz and Moore do is not at
all ~~fancy," judged by contemporary econometric standards or prac-
tices. Second, it requires a lot ofhard and careful digging into historical
data, as well as goodjudgment in putting the data to use. This is a task
in which-so far, at any rate-mathematics and computers can be of
only limited assistance. And third, as is demonstrated in their papers,
it can yield results that, though clearly of limited compass, do throw
light on the question before this conference-the question ofcontinuity
and change in business cycles.
Discussion Summary
The major part of the discussion focused on the clear methodological
difference between this paper and all the other papers presented at this
conference. Stanley Fischerfirst drewattention to thefact thatalthough
several other papers had paid homage to Mitchell's reference cycle
method, they all had inevitably ended up conductingtheirinvestigations
in the time domain. Moore noted that Blanchard and Watson stated
they had decided against the reference cycle approach because it of-
fered no way to conduct rigorous tests of hypotheses, whereas Moore
believed that many hypotheses could be and had been rigorously tested
in this way. Examples abound in the business cycle studies of the
NBER. Sims responded that calendar time was preferable to reference
cycles for a number of reasons. In a vector autoregression system it
is possible to use the data explicitly to formulate a distribution over
the system'sforecasts. One can then test how well the estimated system
tracks the economy. In a reference cycle framework such forecasts and
tests are more difficult because the researcher does not know what the
length of the current cycle will be.
Some participants contended that theoretical justifications for the
use ofthe reference cycle technique are also weak. Sims remarked that579 Major Changes in Cyclical Behavior
it is possible to construct linear models that exhibit stationary random
fluctuations. In general, however, the times between peaks and troughs
vary widely in such models. He also noted that even when the reference
cycle is the true model, the usefulness of time series methods is not
ruled out. Lawrence Summers elaborated on this point, stating that
results obtained by his graduate students supported this view. He found
that VARs were able to capture asymmetries over successive business
cycles. (See the DeLong/Summers paper on symmetry in this volume
following the Blanchard/Watson paper [chap. 2].) Moore remarked that
the cyclical behavior of a series is dependent on the sampling period
used and said he understood that VARs 'Nere sensitive to the choice
ofthe sampling period. Sims responded that this is less true now, since
it appears that monthly VAR systems are often able to track both short-
and long-term movements in variables quite well.
As an addendum to this discussion, Zarnowitz notes that the pre-
vailing procedure in applied econometrics is to use discrete-time fixed
unit periods on the implicit assumption that the timing interval of the
given model coincides with the data sampling interval. The two inter-
vals, however, need not be equal, and where they are not major errors
may well result (as shown in recent papers by Christiano and others).
In short, the results of empirical analyses can be highly sensitive to
the timing specifications of a model, yet the latter are often arbitrary
and seldom tested. How stable over time the decision lags are is also
generally unknown, but it is clear that SOllIe important timing relations
vary rather systematically over the business cycle; for example, the
average delivery periods C'vendor perfonnance
n
) lengthen in expan-
sions and shorten in contractions. The related problems of the proper
choice ofthe time units and the variability ofthe lags are both important
and in need of much further study: strong claims of knowledge about
how to treat them seem to be lacking foundation at present.
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